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ABSTRACT 
 
Do Foreign Experts Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms?
*
 
While most countries welcome (and some even subsidise) high-skilled immigrants, there is 
very limited evidence of their importance for domestic firms. To guide our empirical analysis, 
we first set up a simple theoretical model to show how foreign experts may impact on the 
productivity and wages of domestic firms. Using matched worker-firm data from Denmark and 
a difference-indifferences matching approach, we then find that firms that hire foreign experts 
– defined as employees eligible for reduced taxation under the Danish “Tax scheme for 
foreign researchers and key employees” – both become more productive (pay higher wages) 
and increase their exports of goods and services. 
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1. Introduction 
There is ample evidence documenting that global firms are more productive than purely local 
firms: foreign-owned companies are more productive than domestic companies (see, e.g., 
Lipsey,  2004);  exporting  firms  are  more  productive  than  non-exporting  firms  (see,  e.g., 
Bernard and Jensen, 1995, and Bernard et al., 2007); and firms that offshore internationally 
are more productive than non-offshoring firms (see, e.g., Hummels et al., 2011).  In this 
paper, we consider yet another possible channel through which global firms may become 
more productive than non-global firms, namely by employing foreign experts.  
The importance of foreign experts for the performance of firms is also interesting 
from a policy point of view. Despite widespread restrictions on international migration of 
labour,  most  countries  welcome  these  highly  qualified  immigrants.  Some  countries  even 
subsidise immigrants if their qualifications are sufficiently high. In, e.g., Denmark, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands, foreign labour with sufficiently high qualifications are 
offered special tax breaks. An important question is therefore whether these experts are in 
fact particularly valuable for the host countries.  
In our empirical analysis, we employ a matched worker-firm longitudinal data set 
covering the total Danish population of workers and private firms for the years 1995-2007, 
and we define foreign experts as employees eligible for reduced taxation under the Danish 
“Tax scheme for foreign researchers and key employees”. Using a difference-in-differences 
matching approach, we find evidence that firms become more productive and increase their 
export activities when hiring foreign experts.  
Lazear (1999) has previously argued that a firm may become more productive from 
using foreign labour, if the foreign workers have information which is complementary to that 
of the native workers. For this to be the case, the information sets of foreign and native 
workers should be disjoint but relevant to each other. This information complementarity may 
play a role for all types of labour, but it is likely to be most important among highly skilled 3 
 
workers, where specialized knowledge plays an important role. In this paper, we therefore 
restrict attention to a relatively small group of immigrant workers, the foreign experts.  
In  the  literature,  there  are  several  models  that  feature  strong  complementarities 
between different types of inputs. One is the so-called O-Ring theory by Kremer (1993), 
where the productivity of workers in some tasks is strongly increasing in the productivity of 
workers in other tasks. With the purpose of guiding our subsequent empirical analysis, we 
extend the O-Ring theory to the case of expert workers using the ideas from Lazear (1999). 
Our model shows how a limited number of foreign experts in a firm may have a profound 
impact on the realised total factor productivity and profitability of the firm. Furthermore, if 
wages are firm specific due to, e.g., rent sharing – and there is solid evidence pointing to that 
– the use of foreign experts will also manifest itself in higher wages for the employees.  
Since our data set does not contain the required information (capital) to calculate total 
factor productivity (TFP) at the firm level, we focus on wages in the empirical analysis. This 
also comes with the additional advantage that wages are measured with much more precision 
than TFP. The disadvantage of using wages is, of course, that they only constitute an indirect 
measure of firm productivity. However, as we find that foreign experts actually increase firm-
specific  wages,  it  is  a  strong  indication  that  these  experts  also  affect  the  underlying 
productivity of the firms. 
When we distinguish between the wage effects of foreign experts on different types of 
native workers, we find that the use of foreign experts tends to increase the wages of high-
skilled  workers,  while  there  are  no  significant  effects  on  low-skilled  workers.  This  is 
consistent with rent sharing being most important for the group of high-skilled workers as 
these are harder to replace due to the strong complementarities between their specific types of 
skills.  4 
 
One particular channel through which foreign workers may improve the performance 
of a domestic firm is knowledge of foreign markets (Lazear, 1999). Such knowledge will be 
relevant if the firm wants to expand its export activities. We test this hypothesis, and find that 
when a foreign expert is hired, this is followed by an increase in exports. 
There already exists an extensive literature on how immigrant workers affect wages 
and employment of native workers; see, e.g., Card (1990, 2001) and Borjas (2003). However, 
in  most  of  these  studies,  immigrants  are  simply  assumed  to  increase  the  labour  supply. 
Ottaviano  and  Peri  (2008)  allow  for  some  imperfect  substitution  between  native  and 
immigrant workers, but they do not consider the possibility that foreign experts may play a 
special  role  for  the  productivity  of  domestic  firms.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  only 
Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) consider this issue. They set up a theoretical model where 
foreign  experts  may  teach  local  employees  new  "tricks"  and  in  this  way  increase  their 
productivity.  Using  data  on  Columbian  firms,  they  find  that  the  employment  of  foreign 
experts increases firm productivity and wages of the local employees.
1  
The idea that foreign experts raise the productivity of local workers by teaching them 
new "tricks" seems most relevant in the context of developing countries. However, our results 
show  that  even  in  a  high-income  country,  there  may  be  gains  from  introducing  foreign 
experts in a firm. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical 
background. Section 3 outlines the empirical framework, and Section 4 presents the data. 
Section 5 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 There also exists a literature that analyses the importance of ethnic diversity (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2005) and labour diversity more generally (see, e.g., Barrington and Troske, 2001, Hamilton et al., 2004, Iranzo 
et al., 2008, Navon, 2009, and Parrotta et al., 2010) for the productivity of firms. 5 
 
2. Theoretical background 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the effects of hiring 
foreign experts on firm performance. In order to guide our empirical analysis in terms of 
modelling approach and choice of control variables, this section outlines an O-Ring model 
extended  to  the  case  of  foreign  experts.  Below,  we  provide  a  brief  account  of  the  main 
assumptions and predictions, while the details of the model are relegated to an appendix. 
If foreign experts should improve the overall performance of a firm, they should be 
complementary  to  other  inputs  in  the  firm.  Lazear  (1999)  discusses  some  quite  general 
conditions under which foreign workers and native workers constitute complementary inputs 
in the production process. He also argues that it is costly to include workers from different 
countries  in  the  same  organization  as  different  languages  and  different  cultures  must  be 
integrated. The importance of complementarities vs. the cost of communication determines 
whether a firm gains from using foreign workers.  
A well-known theory of complementarities between skills is the so-called O-Ring 
theory by Kremer (1993), where the productivity of a worker is strongly increasing in the 
productivity of her co-workers.
2 As a consequence, high-skilled workers tend to cluster in 
some firms and low-skilled workers in other firms.
3 Specifically, the O-Ring model assumes 
that  the  production  process  consists  of  many  strongly  complementary  tasks,  where  the 
probability of successful completion of a task depends on the quality (skills) of the worker(s) 
                                                 
2 Other theories suggesting strong complementarities between different types of inputs include Sattinger (1979), 
Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1990),  Grossman  and  Maggi  (2000),  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2007)  and  Jones  (2011). 
Verhoogen (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) document complementarities between the quality of inputs 
and plant productivity. 
3 This clustering tendency has recently been used in several studies of migration building on the O-Ring theory. 
In  Hendricks  (2001)  it  is  used  to  explain  why  new  immigrants  tend  to  cluster  in  locations  with  a  high 
concentration  of  previous  immigrants  of  the  same  nationality.  Gianetti  (2003)  uses  the  clustering  result  to 
explain why high-skilled workers tend to migrate to rich regions, and Kreickemeier and Wrona (2011) apply it 
in a context where high-ability workers select into being emigrants (which is costly) in order to signal to firms 
that they are high-quality workers. 6 
 
assigned to the task, and the model does not allow quantity to substitute for quality within a 
task.  
In our paper, the strong complementarities of the O-Ring model are used to argue why 
foreign experts may increase the overall productivity of a firm. We extend the model by 
Kremer (1993) in four important ways.  
First,  we  introduce  a  horizontal  dimension  in  the  skill  composition  of  educated 
workers in addition to the vertical dimension used in the original model. Specifically, we 
assume that among workers with a certain level of skills (the vertical dimension), there is a 
difference with respect to how well their specific types of skills fit the needs of a given firm 
(the horizontal dimension). As an example, consider two persons who both hold an MBA 
from a prestigious business school, and who both have 10 years of management experience 
from successful companies. The market value of these two persons may be identical, but they 
may not fit the needs of a specific company equally well. Such a horizontal difference could 
be  due  to  different  specializations  across  business  schools  or  between  programs  within 
schools,  or  it  could  be  due  to  work  experience  from  different  types  of  firms.  Thus,  an 
important difference between the vertical skill dimension and the horizontal skill dimension 
is that the vertical dimension can be measured by the market value of a worker, whereas the 
horizontal dimension is often impossible to measure directly in empirical analyses. Instead, 
the ability to find the right skills in the horizontal dimension will show up in the observed 
total factor productivity (TFP) of the firm. Note that the horizontal dimension is assumed 
only to apply to the high-skilled (educated) workers, as these are the ones that handle the 
specialized tasks in the firm. 
The existence of a horizontal dimension is also consistent with a narrow interpretation 
of the skill-weights view of human capital by Lazear (2009). In this model, firms may differ 7 
 
in their labour demand, such that some firms demand workers with a specific combination of 
general skills, e.g., a certain MBA combined with experience from a given industry.  
Second, in line with Lazear (1999), we assume that it is costly to hire foreign experts. 
Along the horizontal dimension, firms seek to employ workers with skills as close as possible 
to the ideal skills required to perform the task in question, and the thicker the market is, in 
which firms are searching, the more likely the firm will be to find a candidate with ideal or 
“close-to-ideal” skills. Hence, a firm that searches in both foreign and local markets has a 
better chance of finding a candidate with the right skills than a firm that searches only in local 
markets. However, searching in foreign labour markets is more costly than searching only in 
local markets, and it may also be more costly to hire a foreigner than a local worker.  
In  the  real  world,  the  search-and-hiring  cost  of  a  firm  may  reflect  a  number  of 
different  things,  including  (but  not  limited  to)  the  legal  set-up  such  as  tax  breaks  and 
immigration  laws  that  affect  the  cost  of  searching  for  and  hiring  foreign  workers;  the 
international network/contacts of the firm which are influenced by, e.g., the mix of native 
employees; and pure luck in the sense that some firms are approached by relevant foreign 
workers or run into them accidentally at conferences or trade fairs. For these reasons, we 
assume that the cost of searching for and hiring foreign experts varies across firms. 
Third, in the spirit of Melitz (2003) and a large subsequent theoretical and empirical 
literature,  we  also  assume  that  firms  are  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  an  exogenous 
productivity parameter. That is, some firms are inherently more productive than other firms, 
e.g., because they have a better “business idea” or a more able manager. Observed TFP then 
depends  both  on  the  exogenous  productivity  parameter  and  the  match  quality  in  the 
horizontal dimension, i.e., whether the firm hires foreign experts.  
Finally, wages are assumed to be firm specific for the skilled workers. Firm-specific 
wages may arise if firms have monopsony power in the labour market (Manning, 2003). 8 
 
Recent evidence suggests that such firm-specific labour supply curves actually do exist; see, 
e.g., Falch (2010) and Staiger et al. (2010). Alternatively, firm-specific wages may be the 
result of imperfectly competitive goods markets and rent sharing between firms and workers, 
either through bargaining or efficiency wages; see, e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and 
Amiti and Davis (2011). There is also considerable evidence of this taking place in practice; 
see, e.g., Blanchflower et al. (1996), Hildretch and Oswald (1997) and Arai (2003).  
In the appendix, the firm-specific wages are modelled as the result of rent sharing 
between the firm and the skilled workers. We assume that low-skilled workers are excluded 
from the rent sharing because they are easier to replace as they do not differ in the horizontal 
dimension. As a conse  quence,  an  increase  in  the  variable  profits  of  the  firm  leads  to  an 
increase in the firm-specific skilled wages.
4 
As shown in the appendix, the model implies the existence of a critical value of the 
firm-specific search-and-hiring cost such that only firms with costs below this level will 
extend their recruitment efforts to foreign markets. It is also shown that the critical value 
depends  negatively  on  the  exogenous  firm-specific  productivity  parameter,  due  to  a 
complementarity between this parameter and the quality of the horizontal match. For the 
same reason, the costs of other inputs also affect the critical value. Hence, firms with a low 
search-and-hiring cost or with a high exogenous productivity parameter will extend their 
search for skilled workers to foreign markets, and will therefore be more likely to employ 
foreign experts. As a consequence, these firms will have higher levels of variable profits and 
observed TFP, and they will also pay higher (skilled) wages than otherwise similar firms that 
do not try to recruit in foreign markets. 
An implication of the model is that firms can start employing foreign experts for three 
different reasons (or a combination of these). First, a drop in the firm-specific search-and-
                                                 
4 Assuming firm-specific labour supply curves instead of rent sharing between firms and workers would yield 
qualitatively similar results. 
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hiring cost that takes it below the critical value will cause a firm to start recruiting foreign 
experts, thereby causing an increase in observed TFP, profits and (skilled) wages of the firm. 
Due to the strong complementarities between the different inputs, the size of these effects 
will depend on the initial characteristics of the firm (which in turn are determined by the 
exogenous productivity parameter). 
Second, the employment of a foreign expert may be the result of an increase in the 
exogenous productivity parameter, as this lowers the firm-specific critical value by making it 
more important for the firm to obtain a better horizontal quality of labour input. In this case, 
observed productivity, profits and (skilled) wages will increase for all firms experiencing an 
increase in their exogenous productivity, but more if it also induces the firm to recruit foreign 
experts.  
Third, changes in general framework conditions such as the cost of capital or the 
general wage level will affect the critical values of all firms but only cause some of them (the 
marginal ones) to start recruiting foreign experts. As in the second case, the performance of 
all firms will be affected, but more positively for those who start recruiting foreign experts. In 
all cases, the size of the effects also depends on the initial firm characteristics. 
3. Empirical framework 
Our theory model illustrates that firms that use foreign experts are both more productive and 
profitable and therefore pay higher wages than other firms. This is both because the foreign 
experts ensure a better match between tasks and skills, and because it is the most productive 
firms that benefit most from employing foreign experts. Thus, as the previous section also 
showed,  firms  may  start  recruiting  foreign  experts  for  three  different  reasons  (or  a 
combination  of  these):  (1)  a  reduction  in  the  firm-specific  search-and-hiring  cost;  (2)  an 
increase  in  the  firm-specific  exogenous  productivity  parameter;  and  (3)  changes  in  the 
general framework conditions. In the first case, the associated changes in firm performance 10 
 
can be given a causal interpretation, while in the second and third case, we need to isolate the 
effect of the foreign experts from the effects of the exogenous productivity increase and the 
changes in the framework conditions. 
Hence, to identify the causal effects on firm performance from hiring foreign experts 
we must pay special attention to selection effects, and therefore we apply a difference-in-
differences matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1997). That is, we compare the change in 
performance in firms that hire foreign experts (the treatment group) to that in other firms 
which have similar initial characteristics and which realize the same exogenous changes (or 
lack of changes) in productivity, but where the firm-specific search-and-hiring costs remain 
above the critical value (the control group). 
By  using  a  difference-in-differences  approach,  we  eliminate  the  effects  of  time-
invariant factors (such as differences in exogenous productivity) and the effects of common 
changes  in  framework  conditions  that  affect  firm  performance.  However,  as  initial  firm 
characteristics affect not only initial performance and the likelihood of hiring foreign experts 
(those  closest  to  the  critical  value  are  more  likely),  but  also  the  effects  of  hiring  these, 
matching  on  these  characteristics  is  important.  Furthermore,  we  need  also  to  match  on 
exogenous productivity changes as these affect both observed performance, the likelihood of 
hiring foreign experts and the effects of these.  
Matching on the exogenous productivity development is, of course, complicated by 
the  fact  that  the  exogenous  part  of  productivity  is  unobservable,  and  the  literature  on 
production-function estimation has long struggled with this issue using different proxies for 
exogenous productivity shocks; see, e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003). What we do is to use the employment of native experts as a proxy for exogenous 
increases in productivity. Hence, we require that the firms in the control group also hire new 
experts, but local experts instead of foreign experts. In this way, our control firms are also 11 
 
likely to have been hit by a positive productivity shock, but choose to stick to domestic 
experts. Furthermore, we match on the initial average wage growth in the firm, taking this as 
an indicator of the historical productivity growth in the firm and therefore as a prediction of 
future exogenous productivity growth as well. 
Matching with many covariates, as in our case, leads to a dimensionality problem, so 
we use the propensity score method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to summarise the vector 
of matching characteristics,  , into a single-index variable, the propensity score,  ( ). The 
propensity score is the conditional probability that a firm hires a foreign expert. The first step 
in the matching analysis is to estimate the propensity score for the firms in the treatment and 
the control groups using a probit model. In Section 5, we discuss in detail the variables 
included in the model. 
Having estimated the propensity score for all treatment and control firms, we can 
estimate the average effect of hiring foreign experts among the treated firms, the so-called 
“average effect of treatment on the treated” (ATET). This is done by comparing the change in 
performance of a treated firm with the change in performance of one or more firms in the 
control  group  with  similar  propensity  scores.  In  this  way,  we  compare  the  change  in 
performance in firms which have similar initial characteristics.  
Specifically,  the  matching  difference-in-differences  (MDID)  estimator  takes  the 
following form:
5 
 ﾠ      =
 
  
∆    −    ,  Δ    ∈    ∈  ∩                          (1) 
 where  ∆     denotes  the  difference  in  the  wage  level  (or  another  measure  of  firm 
performance) in firm j before and after a foreign expert is hired, and   and   are the sets of 
treatment and control firms, respectively.   is the number of firms in the set  , where 
                                                 
5 See Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009) for a recent exposition of the MDID estimator. 
1 I 0 I
1 N 1 P IS ∩12 
 
 denotes the common support region of the propensity score. Hence,    ∩    is the set of 
treatment firms for which a matching control firm can be found. The weights,    ,  , are 
constructed such that they depend on the distance in propensity scores between firm j and 
firm  i.  We  implement  two  different  matching  estimators  to  construct  the  weights:  the 
standard nearest-neighbour matching estimator, where only one comparison firm is used (the 
one with the propensity score closest to the treatment firm), and the local-linear matching 
estimator where multiple comparison units are used (and where the weights are inversely 
proportional to the distance).  
4. Data 
We have access to a very rich matched worker-firm longitudinal data set covering the total 
Danish population of workers and firms for the years 1995-2007. The data are drawn from 
several administrative registers in Statistics Denmark. The source of the firm data is the Firm 
Statistics Register (FirmStat), which provides annual information on industry affiliation (six-
digit NACE code), the number of full-time employees, sales and export volume. FirmStat 
associates each firm with a unique identifier, which allows us to track the same firm over 
time. 
Detailed information on individual socio-economic characteristics is available on an 
annual basis. There is information about, e.g., age, sex, citizenship, labour market experience, 
tenure, education and a wage rate calculated as annual labour income divided by annual 
working hours. In the following, we distinguish between high-skilled, medium-skilled and 
low-skilled  workers.  High-skilled  workers  refer  to  persons  with  a  tertiary  education 
according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Medium-skilled 
workers have a vocational education defined as the final stage of secondary education that 
prepares students for entry into the labour market. Finally, persons with the equivalent of 
high school education or less are classified as low-skilled workers. These individual level 
P S13 
 
variables are extracted from the integrated database for labour market research (IDA) and the 
income  registers  in  Statistics  Denmark.  IDA  also  associates  each  person  with  a  unique 
identifier, which allows us to track workers over time. 
To match the firm data with the worker data we draw on the Firm-Integrated Database 
for Labour Market Research (FIDA), which for a given year links every firm in FirmStat with 
all the workers in IDA who are employed by that firm in week 48 of the given year.  
4.1 Foreign experts 
Our  data  on  foreign  experts  are  provided  by  the  Danish  tax  authorities  who  record 
information about firms hiring foreign experts that are eligible for reduced income taxation 
under the “Tax scheme for foreign researchers and key employees”. This data set uses the 
same firm and worker identifiers as FIDA, allowing us to match the data with our worker-
firm data on an annual basis. 
The tax scheme was introduced in 1992 and applies a flat tax rate of 25 %, which is 
much lower than the normal tax rates in the Danish tax system (the highest marginal tax rate 
was around 60 % in the period under consideration). The scheme was changed in 2002. 
Before 2002, foreign experts were eligible for the reduced tax rate for the first three years, 
but if their stay in Denmark extended seven years, they were liable to pay a reimbursement 
tax equivalent to the subsidy obtained in the first three years. In 2002 this reimbursement tax 
was abolished such that the foreign experts can now stay in Denmark as long as they wish 
without paying any additional taxes to compensate for the subsidy in the first three years. As 
this change makes it easier to attract foreign experts, it ensures some exogenous variation in 
the search-and-hiring costs of the firms in the period under consideration. 
To be eligible for the reduced tax rate some requirements must be met. The most 
important ones are the following. First, the employee should not have been liable to pay taxes 
in Denmark for the previous three years. This implies that not only foreigners but also Danes 14 
 
who have stayed abroad for more than three years may be eligible for the reduced tax rate. 
Throughout this paper, we include these persons among the “foreign” experts, as they must 
all be recruited from abroad, and hence are likely associated with higher search-and-hiring 
costs than truly domestic experts. The second requirement is that it does not count as years 
abroad if a person was expatriated by his or her Danish employer. Third, the monthly salary 
of  the  person  should  be  above  a  threshold  level  which  in  2007  was  DKK  65,408 
(corresponding to around 8,800 Euros). Hence, this threshold level of income is effectively 
what defines an expert, i.e., a person who has a sufficiently high productivity to command 
this salary. It should be mentioned that foreign experts may be eligible for the low tax rate in 
jobs  paying  wages  below  the  threshold  level,  if  they  are  employed  by  a  university  or  a 
research institution. However, in the following we restrict attention to the foreign experts 
employed  in  private  firms,  where  they  are  all  required  to  have  a  wage  higher  than  the 
threshold level.  
In Figure 1, we illustrate the development in the number of foreign experts in private 
firms. It is a relatively low number of employees who by our definition are foreign experts. In 
1995 there were around 600, and this number had increased to around 1700 in 2007. Most of 
the  foreign  experts  are  hired  in  the  service  sector;  only  one  quarter  is  employed  in 
manufacturing. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Table  1  illustrates  the  distribution  of  the  foreign  experts  over  origin  countries 
(citizenship) in 1995 and 2007. The countries are ranked according to their share of the 
foreign experts in 2007. In 2007, 20 % of the foreign experts had Danish citizenship. These 
are  Danes  who  have  been  working  abroad  for  at  least  3  years  prior  to  their  current 
employment. In 1995, only 3 % of the foreign experts were Danes. This development could 
be explained by the change in the programme in 2002, as it is likely to be more valuable for 15 
 
Danes that they can stay in Denmark for more than seven years without having to pay back 
the subsidy obtained in the first three years. The other main suppliers of foreign experts to 
Danish firms are the neighbouring countries, Germany and Sweden, followed by the UK and 
the  US.  In  2007,  all  other  countries  each  contributed  with  less  than  5  %  of  the  foreign 
experts. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 2 illustrates the distribution of foreign experts across industries. The industries 
are ranked according to their share of the foreign experts in 2007. It is somewhat surprising 
that 16 % and 35 % of the foreign experts were employed within Wholesale and commission 
trade in 1995 and 2007, respectively. The other industries that employ many foreign experts 
are R&D-intensive industries and industries where the quality of the good is likely to depend 
on the input of very specialized skills. This is, in particular, the case within Manufacture of 
chemicals  and  chemical  products,  Computer  and  related  activities  and  Research  and 
development. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
The data also allow us to analyse whether foreign and domestic experts are employed 
in similar occupations. In the following, we define domestic experts as native employees 
receiving  a  wage  above  the  level  required  to  be  eligible  for  the  reduced  tax  scheme  for 
foreign workers. Not surprisingly, both foreign and domestic experts are employed in more 
advanced  occupations  such  as  Managers,  Professionals,  and  Technicians  and  associate 
professionals; see Table 3. However, foreign experts are slightly more concentrated in the 
top-2 occupations (Managers and Professionals) than domestic experts. This is consistent 
with foreign experts earning somewhat higher wages despite being of roughly the same age 
and gender composition as domestic experts; see Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 16 
 
4.2 Firms with foreign experts 
In the following, we focus on private sector firms with at least 10 full-time employees, as the 
use of experts is likely to play a different (less specialized) role in smaller firms. Table 4 
displays the total number of firms in our sample (column 1), the number of firms with foreign 
experts  (column  2)  and  the  number  of  firms  with  domestic  experts  (column  3).  Only  a 
minority  of  the  firms  have  foreign  experts  in  their  workforce  –  less  than  600  out  of 
approximately 20,000 firms employ foreign experts in 2007. In contrast, around half of the 
firms use domestic experts. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The fourth column of Table 4 shows the number of firms that start to use foreign 
experts  in  a  given  year.  These  observations  will  constitute  the  treatment  group  in  the 
matching  analysis  below.  A  firm  is  classified  as  a  treatment  firm  if  the  following  three 
conditions are met: (i) it should be observed in at least five consecutive years:   − 2,   −1,  , 
  + 1 and   + 2; (ii) it should not employ foreign experts in   − 1 and   − 2 (and ﾠ  − 3 if 
present in that year as well); (iii) it is observed with at least one foreign expert among its 
employees in year  . For   = 1998, there are 48 firms that satisfy these conditions. In total, 
there are 557 firms in the treatment group in Table 4. Around 30 of these are dropped in the 
subsequent  matching  analysis  because  of  missing  observations  and  the  common  support 
requirement. 
The observations in column 5 constitute the control group. These are firms that are 
observed in at least five consecutive years,   − 2,   − 1,  ,   + 1 and   + 2, and which hired 
at least one domestic expert in year  . Note that these conditions imply that a given firm can 
enter the control group with more than one observation if it satisfies the above requirements 
for,  e.g.,  both    = 1998  and    = 1999.  In  column  5,  there  is  a  total  of  23,791  control 
observations, but in the matching analysis we impose the additional requirement that these 17 
 
firms should not hire foreign experts in any of the five years or earlier sample years, which 
reduces the control sample to around 14,000 observations.  
Firms  that  start  to  hire  foreign  experts  are  different  from  firms  without  foreign 
experts. Table 5 reports the results of simple regressions where the treatment and control 
observations are compared. The dependent variable is a firm characteristic measured in   − 1 
(the year prior to treatment), and the explanatory variable is the treatment indicator. It is seen 
that firms that hire foreign experts are bigger, have higher sales, export more, use more high-
skilled labour, use more domestic experts and pay higher wages. These differences persist 
when including industry fixed effects and firm size as additional controls, and it suggests that 
selection effects play an important role as predicted by our theory. Firms that hire foreign 
experts  are  on  average  different  from  firms  that  do  not  hire  foreign  experts,  and  it  is 
necessary to appropriately control for these selection effects, if we wish to uncover the causal 
effects of the foreign experts. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
5. Results 
Table 5 showed that average wages are higher in firms employing foreign experts. While this 
suggests a positive effect of foreign experts on firm performance, our theory model showed 
that the incentive to hire foreign experts is also higher in the more productive firms. To 
identify the causal effect of hiring foreign experts, we argued in Section 3 that we must 
compare the development in firms that hire foreign experts to that in other firms which have 
both  similar  initial  characteristics  and  which  realize  the  same  exogenous  changes  in 
productivity.  This  section  therefore  contains  the  results  of  the  difference-in-differences 
matching analysis described in Section 3. 
First, we consider the effect on firm-level outcomes, in particular the average wage in 
the firm, from hiring foreign experts. As firm-level measures may be affected by composition 18 
 
effects, we subsequently consider the effects on individual wages.  Finally, we investigate 
one  particular  channel  through  which  foreign  experts  may  complement  other  inputs: 
knowledge of foreign markets. To test this, we analyse whether foreign experts are used to 
promote exporting activities. 
5.1 Firm-level outcomes 
The first step in applying the MDID estimator is to predict the propensity scores for all 
treatment and control observations. In estimating the probit model, we include a number of 
initial firm characteristics measured in   − 1 (the year before hiring foreign experts for the 
treatment firms) as well as a proxy for exogenous changes in productivity.  
The initial firm characteristics included are expected to reflect the initial productivity 
level and the initial composition of factor inputs. Hence, we include the log of the average 
wage level as this is likely to depend on firm productivity, cf. Section 2. We also include two 
measures of firm size (the number of full-time employees and turnover) as size is typically 
found to be strongly correlated with productivity; see, e.g., Oi and Idson (1999). We also 
include two measures of export activity (an exporter dummy and the share of exports in 
turnover), as exporting activity is also found to be associated with higher productivity; see, 
e.g., Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Bernard et al. (2007). When it comes to the composition 
of  factor  inputs,  we  include  the  shares  of  high-  and  medium-skilled  workers  in  firm 
employment as well as the share of domestic experts. Finally, we include year and industry 
dummies in the probit model. 
As  a  proxy  for  the  exogenous  productivity  development,  we  use  the  initial  wage 
growth (between   − 2 and   − 1). This is an indicator of the historical productivity growth in 
the  firm  and  therefore  also  a  prediction  of  future  exogenous  productivity  growth. 
Furthermore, control firms are all required to hire a domestic expert in period   as explained 
in Section 4. 19 
 
Table 6 shows the results from the estimation of the probit model. It is seen that large 
firms with high export ratios, a large share of high-skilled workers and a high initial wage 
level are more likely to hire foreign experts. This is fully consistent with the theory model 
from Section 2. More surprisingly, the share of domestic experts and the initial wage growth 
rate do not significantly affect the probability of hiring a foreign expert.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Having predicted the propensity scores from the probit model above, the next step is 
to estimate the ATET using the two matching estimators described in Section 3. However, as 
we are not matching directly on the covariates but on the propensity scores, it has to be 
checked  that  this  procedure  is  able  to  balance  the  distribution  of  the  relevant  covariates 
among the treatment and the matched control firms.  
Table 7 displays the standardized biases for the variables in the probit models when 
using  the  local-linear  matching  estimator.  The  standardized  bias  shows  the  difference  in 
sample means in the treated and matched control subsamples as a percentage of the square 
root of the average of sample variances in both groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This is 
one way to evaluate the quality of the match. It is seen that matching generally reduces the 
bias substantially for all variables, and that the treatment and control groups are comparable 
after matching. In particular, there are no significant differences in covariate means for the 
two groups after matching. 
It turns out that using nearest-neighbour matching results in a somewhat lower match 
quality, although the standardized bias only exceeds 10 % for two (out of 25) covariates. 
Hence, in the following, we present only the results from using local-linear matching. The 
nearest-neighbour matching results, which are very similar, are available from the authors 
upon request. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 20 
 
The first row of Table 8 shows the effect (ATET) of hiring foreign experts on the 
change in average wages between year   − 1 and   (the year where foreign experts are hired). 
We find no significant effect on this outcome, but there is a significantly positive effect of 
almost 2.5 % on the change in average wages between   − 1 and   + 2. That is, in firms 
hiring foreign experts, average wages increase by 2.5 % more than in similar firms hiring 
only domestic experts. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
In Table 8, it is also reported how firm-level sales, total employment and the skill 
composition are affected by the hiring of foreign experts. Although the effects are estimated 
to be insignificant, employment tends to decrease (close to being significant), while sales 
tend to increase (insignificantly). The combination of these two effects also suggests that 
productivity tends to increase in firms that hire foreign experts. Finally, Table 8 shows that 
the composition of workers changes within the firm such that the share of medium-skilled 
workers declines while the share of high-skilled workers increases. This suggests that the 
increase in average wages may be driven by compositional changes within the firm. We 
investigate this issue further in the following subsection. 
5.2 Worker-level outcomes 
We can exploit the wealth of information in our matched worker-firm data to circumvent the 
impact of within-firm compositional changes on the average wage. To do this, we focus on 
individual wages in the following. 
  In this case, the treatment and control observations consist of all workers who remain 
in  the  treatment  and  control  firms  in  all  five  years  (  − 2  to    + 2).  This  yields  around 
100,000 treatment observations (of which around 10 % are lost due to the common support 
requirement) and around one million control observations. When estimating the propensity 
score, we match on the same firm characteristics as above but also include a number of 21 
 
worker  characteristics  such  as  the  initial  wage,  age,  marital  status,  number  of  children, 
education, labour market experience, tenure in the firm, occupation, region of residence and 
immigrant status.
6  
When  worker-level  data  are  used,  the  local-linear  matching  method  does  not 
converge, and therefore only nearest-neighbour matching results are presented. The quality of 
the  match  for  the  firm-level  covariates  is  comparable  to  that  obtained  in  the  firm-level 
analysis, while matching quality is in general better for the covariates at the worker level. 
Hence, only for three covariates (out of 50) do the standardized biases after matching exceed 
10 %. 
Table 9 shows the treatment effects on the full sample of workers remaining in their 
firms in at least five years. We see that in year   and   + 2 there are significantly positive 
effects on the wages of 0.2 % and 0.3 %, respectively. The effect in   + 1 is also positive 
(0.08 %) but insignificant. As the effects are considerably smaller numerically than when 
using average wages, it supports the idea that compositional changes are also important for 
the development in average wages. 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
Table 9 also reports separate wage effects for low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-
skilled workers. As expected, the wage effects are strongest and most positive for the high-
skilled workers. Here the effects are in the range of 0.5-0.65 % and significant in  ,   + 1 and 
  + 2.
7 For low-skilled workers, the effects are insignificant throughout, while the picture for 
medium-skilled  workers  is  more  mixed  with  a  positive  effect  the  first  year,  which  turns 
negative in the second year, and which disappears by the third year.  
                                                 
6 Results from estimating the probit model are available from the authors upon request. 
7 The match quality is also better when considering only high-skilled workers with all standardized biases being 
below 10 % after matching. 22 
 
That wage effects are most pronounced for the high-skilled workers is consistent with 
the idea that rent sharing takes place mainly between the firms and the high-skilled workers, 
as  these  are  harder  to  replace  than  the  low-skilled  workers,  due  to  the  strong 
complementarities between the specific types of skills of the high-skilled workers. 
5.3 International trade effects of foreign experts 
The  evidence  above  suggests  that  foreign  experts  increase  the  productivity  of  firms. 
According to Lazear (1999), the reason might be that foreign experts have information which 
is relevant and complementary to the information of native workers. There may of course be 
many channels through which such complementarities can arise, but one obvious possibility 
is that foreign experts are used to increase export activities. This could happen if foreign 
workers speak the local language at export destinations or if they have special knowledge 
about the culture and markets which is complementary to the knowledge of native workers; 
se also Molina and Muendler (2010) who emphasize the importance of specific skills when 
exporting. The firms may also be able to exploit the network of the foreign expert at the 
export destination.  
To analyse this, we test whether firms tend to take up or increase their exporting 
activities after hiring foreign experts. Table 10 shows the estimated effects on exporter status 
(rows 1-3) and the share of exports in total turnover (rows 4-6), using the same matching 
procedure as the one underlying the results in Table 8. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
We see that hiring foreign experts do in fact increase the probability that a firm is 
exporting  by  2.7  percentage  points  the  following  year.  The  effect  is  still  positive  in  the 
following two years but no longer significant. Moreover, we see that the export intensity 
increases significantly by 1.3-1.6 % in all three years following the employment of a foreign 23 
 
expert. This strongly suggests that firms use the foreign experts to increase their activities at 
foreign markets. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that there may exist strong complementarities between the 
knowledge (skills) of foreign experts and native workers in a company. In this case, a few 
foreign  experts  may  give  rise  to  a  significant  increase  in  firm  productivity.  By  applying 
difference-in-differences matching techniques to a rich Danish data set, we find support for 
this prediction. The average wage level in the firm increases significantly by 2.4 % in the 
third year following the employment a foreign expert. We take this as evidence of a positive 
productivity effect. 
Using worker-level information, we find that wages increase significantly in both the 
first and the third year after the foreign expert has arrived, and when we distinguish between 
different  types  of  worker,  we  find  that  the  effect  is  strongest  (0.5-0.65  %)  and  most 
significant for the high-skilled workers. The latter is fully consistent with rent sharing being 
most relevant for the high-skilled natives workers, as these are the ones for which strong 
complementarities  exist  and  hence  are  more  difficult  to  replace  than  low-skilled  native 
workers. The fact that average wages increase more than individual wages also indicate that 
an upgrade in the composition of firm employment takes place following the employment of 
a foreign expert. 
One reason why firms may benefit from foreign workers is that these possess special 
knowledge about foreign markets. This hypothesis is confirmed by our study as the hiring of 
foreign experts both raises the probability of exporting the following year by 2.7 percentage 
points and the intensity of exports by 1.3-1.6 % in the three following years. 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains the formal derivation of the theory model and results from Section 2.  
We assume that the production in firm j is given by:  
     =     
 ℎ 
   
 ,              (A1) 
where Aj is the exogenous productivity parameter, kj is capital, hj is the input of skilled 
labour, and lj is the input of unskilled labour.
8 The use of skilled labour is organised around a 
number of tasks, with the total input of skilled labour given by:  
ℎ  = Π   
       ∙ (1 −     ∙   ,          (A2) 
where sj is the number of skilled workers, and nj is the number of tasks in firm j. qij is the 
(average) skill level of the workers in task i (0 ≤ qij ≤ 1), and dij is the (average) distance 
between the optimal skill type and the actual skill type in task i (0 ≤ dij ≤ 1). If qij = 1 and dij = 
0 for all i, then workers have the highest possible skill levels as measured by qij (the vertical 
dimension), and their skill types perfectly match the needs of the firm as measured by dij (the 
horizontal dimension). In Kremer (1993), dij is implicitly equal to zero. Since sj is the number 
of skilled workers employed, sj/nj is the number of replications of the required tasks in the 
firm. To simplify the exposition, we assume that nj is exogenous and does not vary across 
firms, i.e.,    =  . 
In the following, observed total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as the part of firm 
productivity that cannot be explained by the observed quality and quantity of inputs.
9 Ideally, 
the only part of the production function to be included in observed TFP is the exogenous 
productivity parameter, Aj. In practice, however, observed TFP will also reflect the value of 
the dij's, as we cannot measure the extent to which the firm has success in hiring candidates 
with the optimal skill types. Similarly, observed TFP will also to some extent reflect the qij's, 
                                                 
8 In the empirical specification, we distinguish between three skill levels of labour, but to avoid unnecessary 
complexity, we use only two types in the theory model. 
9  Syverson  (2011) provides a recent discussion of different concepts and problems related to defining and 
measuring TFP. 25 
 
since  even  when  these  can  be  observed  (through  wages),  we  do  not  have  the  required 
information about the number of tasks to correct for this in the measurement of TFP. To 
illustrate this, we can insert (A2) in (A1) and express the production function as: 
   =       ∙   
  ∙   
  ∙   
 ,            (A3) 
where TFPj is the observed TFP of firm j given by: 
      =    ∙ Π   
      ∙ 1 −    
 
          (A4) 
If the price of the good produced by the firm is normalized to one, the variable profits 
are given by: 
   =    −       
 
    +      ,   
 
    ∙
  
  −    ∙    −   ∙      (A5) 
where    is the unskilled market wage, r is the exogenous cost of capital, and         is the 
firm-specific wage of a skilled worker of quality qij.  (   ,   ) is the cost of recruiting a 
skilled worker (of a given quality) where the distance between the optimal type and the actual 
type hired is dij, and     is a measure of the extent of the market in which firm j searches for 
skilled workers.
10 Specifically, we shall assume that: 
     ,    =     ∙ 1 −    
   
          (A6) 
Hence, a better match comes at a higher cost,         < 0. Furthermore, the marginal cost 
of improving the match increases as the match gets closer to the optimal match,         
  >
0.
11 However, if the firm gets access to a larger market for skilled labour (represented by a 
smaller  value  of     ),  it  is  able  to  get  the  same  match  at  a  lower  cost,          > 0. 
Furthermore,  access  to  a  larger  market  decreases  the  cost  of  improving  the  match, 
                                                 
10 To be precise, qij is the average quality of workers in task i, and dij is the average distance between the 
optimal skill type and the actual skill type in task i. Hence, strictly speaking,   (   ) is the wage cost per worker 
of getting workers with an average quality of qij, and  ( ,   ) is the cost per worker of recruiting skilled 
workers with an average distance of dij between the optimal and the actual types of skills in task i. 
11 The marginal cost also increases with n, reflecting that a larger number of different tasks make it harder to 
obtain a better match within a given task. 26 
 
             < 0.
12 In the following, we assume that E can take only two values:   =   if 
the firm has access only to the domestic labour market, and   =   <   if the firm has access 
to the international market for skilled labour as well, i.e., it tries to recruit foreign experts. 
Access to the international market is associated with a firm-specific fixed cost,   
 .  
In order to focus on the horizontal dimension in the task quality, we let     = 1 for all 
i and j, but we assume that the firm-specific skilled wage differs from the market wage due to 
rent sharing between the firm and the skilled workers: 
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ   =   (1) =    +    
     ,          (A7) 
where    is the exogenous market wage, φ is a profit sharing parameter, and   
      is 
variable profits before rent sharing, i.e.,    = 1 −     
     .
13 
Under  the  assumption  of  decreasing  returns  to  scale  in  all  production  factors, 
   +   +   +   < 1, the following proposition applies: 
Proposition 1 
1.  There  exist  a  critical  value  of  the  fixed  cost  as  a  function  of  Aj  (and  other 
parameters),  (  ), where       > 0, and such that firm j will try to recruit foreign 
experts if and only if   
  ≤ ﾠ (  ). 
2.  A firm j with   
  < ﾠ (  ) will have a higher observed TFP, a higher profit level and a 
higher average wage level than another firm k with    =    and   
  > ﾠ (  ). 
3.  A firm j will have a higher observed TFP, profit and wage level, and a higher chance 
of employing foreign experts than another firm k with   
  =   
  and    <   . 
                                                 
12 More realistically, the probability of getting a better match should increase with the extent of the market. 
However, to keep the analytics tractable, we assume that the match improves with certainty. This assumption 
does not affect the results qualitatively. 
13 Alternatively, we could use variable profits net of rent-sharing in (A7), i.e.,    =   (1) =    +    
 . This 
would not qualitatively affect the results. 27 
 
Proof: Using (A3), (A4), (A6) and (A7) in (A5) together with     = 1 implies that variable 
profits can be written as: 
   = 1 −       
   
   
  ∙ Π   
  1 −    
 
−     −      −      −
     
 
1 −    
     
   
 
Due to symmetry,     =    for all i, and the expression for variable profits reduces to: 
   = 1 −      1 −   
  
  
   
   
  −     −      −      −       1 −   
   
  (A8) 
Now, let  (  ,   ) denote the maximised value of variable profits given    and    . It follows 
immediately from (A8) that  (  , ) >  (  , ) for all    > 0, and hence the critical value is 
given by      ≡     ,  −  (  , ). Furthermore: 
 ′    =   
    ,  −   
    ,  = (1 −  )
    ,    (  , )
  
     (A9) 
where      ,      is  the  optimal  production  level  given      and     ,  and  where  the  second 
equality follows from applying the envelope theorem to (A8). Now, maximising variable 
profits in (A8) with respect to   ,   ,   , and    given    and     results in the following first-
order condition for   : 
   = 1 −
   
  
 
   
≡  (  ,   ),          (A10) 
and the following factor demands: 
   =   
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From  (A10)-(A13)  it  follows  that      ,  <  (  , ),      ,  >  (  , ),      ,  >
 (  , ), and     ,  >  (  , ), and hence that      ,  −     ,  > 0. Thus from (A9), 
we have  ′    > 0, which completes the proof of the first part of Proposition 1.   
Turning to the second part, it follows immediately from (A4) using (A10) and     = 1 
that firm j will have higher observed TFP. Furthermore, profits will always be at least as high 
in firm j, and therefore variable profits will be strictly higher due to the fixed cost,   
 . It 
follows from (A7) that skilled (and hence average) wages will also be higher in firm j. 
Considering the third part, we can distinguish between three situations: (a)     =    =
 ; (b)     =    =  ; and (c)     =  ,    =  .  In cases a and b, the two firms chose the same 
levels of d and have the same likelihood of employing foreign experts, but since    >   , it 
follows from above that firm j will have higher observed TFP, profits and wages. In case c, 
firm j will also have a lower level of d, which further raises observed TFP and the likelihood 
of  employing  foreign  experts.  Furthermore,  since  the  firm  could  have  chosen  the  same 
strategy as firm k, total (and variable) profits must be higher in firm j. ∎ 
The next proposition summarises some comparative statics results, which follow in a 
straightforward manner from the results above and hence are stated without a formal proof. 
Proposition 2 
1.  A  decrease  in    
   increases  the  likelihood  that  firm  j  hires  foreign  experts  and 
increases its observed TFP, profit and wage level. 
2.  An increase in Aj raises observed TFP, profits and wages and the likelihood that firm 
j hires foreign experts. 
3.  A decrease in the cost of capital and/or the wage rates may cause some firms to hire 
foreign experts and increase their observed TFP, profit and wage levels. 29 
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1995 1995 rank 2007 2007 rank
Denmark 0.028 9 0.200 1
Germany 0.069 6 0.143 2
Sweden 0.093 3 0.132 3
UK 0.266 1 0.096 4
USA 0.093 3 0.091 5
Norway 0.132 2 0.047 6
France 0.050 8 0.046 7
Netherlands 0.074 5 0.039 8
Finland 0.065 7 0.031 9
Canada 0.002 15 0.015 10
Note: See text for the definition of foreign experts. Only private sector foreign experts are included above. Information 
about citizenship was only available for 96 and 91 percent of the foreign experts in 1995 and 2007, respectively. 1995 1995 rank 2007 2007 rank
Other business activities 0.206 2 0.184 1
Wholesale and commission trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles) 0.349 1 0.164 2
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.029 8 0.109 3
Computer and related activities 0.032 6 0.105 4
Financial intermediation (except insurance and pension funding) 0.000 26 0.101 5
Research and development 0.000 26 0.050 6
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 0.008 14 0.044 7
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.032 6 0.026 8
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.003 18 0.022 9
Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.039 4 0.019 10
Note: See text for definition of foreign experts. Industries are based on the two-digit NACE classification.
Table 2: Distribution of foreign experts on industries, 1995 and 2007.Foreign experts Domestic experts
Female (1=yes) 0.137 0.153
Average age (years) 41.3 42.1
Median hourly wage rate (Euros) 88.9 63.5
Occupational distribution:
Managers 0.342 0.211
Professionals 0.376 0.314
Technicians and associate professionals 0.247 0.306
Clerical support workers 0.025 0.043
Service and sales workers 0.003 0.023
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 0.000 0.001
Craft and related trades workers 0.001 0.056
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.000 0.023
Elementary occupations 0.006 0.022
Table 3: Characteristics of foreign and domestic experts, 2007.
Note: The occupational distributions are based on the one-digit ISCO classification, including only observations with 
non-missing occupations. See text for definition of foreign experts.(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)
Year All firms Firms with Firms with Firms with newly Firms with newly 
foreign experts domestic experts hired foreign experts hired domestic experts
1995 16343 198 8079
1996 16551 226 8115
1997 16738 256 8014 48 2107
1998 17223 273 8631 42 2322
1999 19307 370 9635 47 2459
2000 19805 414 9937 64 3091
2001 19474 449 9999 71 3173
2002 19152 451 9566 70 2910
2003 18851 461 9089 66 2593
2004 18968 477 8406 77 2411
2005 19410 496 8882 72 2725
2006 20042 533 9447
2007 20667 561 10136
Note: The sample includes manufacturing and service firms with at least 10 employees. The firms in column 4 are firms which: (i) are observed 
in at least five consecutive years, t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and t+2; (ii) do not employ foreign experts in t-2 and t-1; (iii) are observed with at least one 
foreign expert in t. Firms in column 5  are observed in at least five consecutive years, t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and t+2, and hired at least one domestic 
expert in year t. See text for definition of foreign experts.
Table 4. Number of Danish private sector firms with and without foreign experts.(1) (2)
Log (number of employees) 0.57
Log (average wage) 0.13 0.13
Share of domestic experts 0.06 0.05
Share of high-skilled workers 0.11 0.09
Share of medium-skilled workers -0.07 -0.05
Share of low-skilled workers -0.04 -0.04
Log (turnover) 0.73 0.53
Exporter (1=yes) 0.13 0.11
Export/turnover 0.14 0.14
Controls None Size and industry
fixed effects
Table 5: Characteristics of firms hiring foreign experts
Note: The coefficients are from individual regressions of the firm characteristic observed in year t-1 
on the treatment indicator for hiring foreign experts in year t. The sample consists of all treatment 
and control observations.Coeff. Std. Err. z-value
Log (average wage) 0.7013 0.1592 4.41
Log (average wage growth from t-2 to t-1) -0.0998 0.1719 -0.58
Number of employees 0.0002 0.0001 3.32
(Number of employees)
2 0.0000 0.0000 -1.57
Share of domestic experts -0.3276 0.3271 -1.00
Share of domestic experts (t-2) 0.2840 0.2689 1.06
Share of high-skilled workers 0.3364 0.1630 2.06
Share of medium-skilled workers -0.5714 0.1856 -3.08
Log (turnover) 0.1372 0.0178 7.71
Exporter (1=yes) 0.0200 0.0604 0.33
Export/turnover 0.4178 0.0735 5.68
Industry dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Pseudo R squared 0.10
Observations 14221
Treated 528
Control 13693
Table 6: Probit model of the propensity score, firm sample.
Note: See text for definition of treatment and control firms. The explanatory variables are (unless 
otherwise indicated) from t-1, the year before an expert is hired.Table 7: Quality of the match, firm sample.
Mean Mean % % Bias
Variables: Treated Controls Bias reduction t-test p-value
Log (average wage) 5.3768 5.3755 0.5 99.0 0.07 0.94
Log (average wage growth from t-2 to t-1) 0.0446 0.0439 0.5 94.0 0.07 0.94
Number of employees 357.03 287.11 7.3 66.9 1.01 0.31
(Number of employees)
2 1800000 930000 5.2 45.9 0.80 0.43
Share of domestic experts 0.1462 0.1458 0.3 99.2 0.04 0.97
Share of domestic experts (t-2) 0.1540 0.1546 -0.4 98.8 -0.06 0.95
Share of high-skilled workers 0.3228 0.3242 -0.6 98.7 -0.10 0.92
Share of medium-skilled workers 0.3532 0.3544 -0.7 98.2 -0.12 0.91
Log (turnover) 11.9660 11.8910 4.9 90.3 0.79 0.43
Exporter (1=yes) 0.8030 0.7923 2.5 92.3 0.44 0.66
Export/turnover 0.3618 0.3581 1.1 97.4 0.17 0.87
Note: The standardized bias for a given variable is defined as the difference in means between the treated firms and the matched comparison group 
scaled by the average variances. The explanatory variables are (unless otherwise indicated) from t-1, the year before an expert is hired.ATET t-stat.
Log (average wage in t) 0.0018 0.27
Log (average wage in t+1) 0.0111 1.81
Log (average wage in t+2) 0.0242 3.41
Log (employment in t) 0.0112 0.66
Log (employment in t+1) -0.0133 -0.64
Log (employment in t+2) -0.0327 -1.26
Log (turnover in t) 0.0128 0.64
Log (turnover in t+1) 0.0078 0.25
Log (turnover in t+2) 0.0086 0.23
Share of low-skilled workers in t -0.0016 -0.59
Share of low-skilled workers in t+1 0.0002 0.05
Share of low-skilled workers in t+2 -0.0005 -0.11
Share of medium-skilled workers in t -0.0021 -0.83
Share of medium-skilled workers in t+1 -0.0099 -2.80
Share of medium-skilled workers in t+2 -0.0096 -2.25
Share of high-skilled workers in t 0.0037 1.35
Share of high-skilled workers in t+1 0.0076 2.15
Share of high-skilled workers in t+2 0.0075 1.74
Table 8: Treatment effects, firm sample.
Note: All treatment effects are calculated using local-linear matching without replacement. 
The dependent variables are measured as the difference in outcome between t-1 (the year 
before treatment) and t or t+1 or t+2 (as indicated). A common support restriction has 
been imposed.ATET t-stat. ATET t-stat. ATET t-stat. ATET t-stat.
Log (wage in t) 0.0022 2.86 -0.0014 -1.09 0.0023 2.06 0.0057 3.62
Log (wage in t+1) 0.0008 0.96 -0.0001 -0.04 -0.0030 -2.51 0.0051 2.90
Log (wage in t+2) 0.0033 3.28 0.0029 1.50 0.0016 1.15 0.0065 3.04
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
Note: All treatment effects are calculated using nearest-neighbour matching without replacement. The dependent variables are measures as the 
difference in outcome between t-1 (the year before treatment) and t or t+1 or t+2 (as indicated). A common support restriction has been imposed.
Table 9: Treatment effects, worker sample.ATET t-stat.
Exporter (1=yes) in t 0.0273 2.56
Exporter (1=yes) in t+1 0.0130 0.94
Exporter (1=yes) in t+2 0.0184 1.20
Export/turnover in t 0.0126 2.42
Export/turnover in t+1 0.0148 2.09
Export/turnover in t+2 0.0163 2.06
Table 10: Export treatment effects, firm sample.
Note: All treatment effects are calculated using local-linear matching without replacement. 
The dependent variables are measured as the difference in outcome between t-1 (the year 
before treatment) and t or t+1 or t+2 (as indicated). A common support restriction has 
been imposed.0
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Figure 1: Foreign experts in private firms
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